




Governmentality Studies and China: 




Chinese governmentality is a hybrid born of crisis. In some ways, it was born of a theoretical crisis within Western Marxism. That theoretical crisis erupted in the late ‘seventies when, to use the words of Louis Althusser from 1978, ‘something snapped.’​[1]​ That something was the Marxist Theory of the State. 1978 was also a year of when, in effect, the Chinese Marxist Theory of the State also snapped. 
Having earlier (1976) rejected the Cultural Revolution, dismissed class struggle as the primary mechanism of change and abandoned the idea of an ‘all-round dictatorship of the proletariat,’ Chinese Marxism embarked on a road that appeared to return to classical Marxism —with its reemphasis on developing the productive forces— but which would end up valorising a market regime. It was in 1978 that the Communist Party moved beyond the classical Marxist texts to announce a radical economic reform programme that would slowly and unevenly push China toward the embrace of a fully blown (socialist) market economy.  What was different about the Chinese case, however, was that when something in their approach to the Marxist theory of the State snapped, it produced major institutional and societal change. 
To different degrees, in different ways, and at different speeds, the Chinese State began to transform itself. What had once been an all-round dictatorship was no more, as the State and theories about it splintered into a series of debates about iron clad economic laws, key areas of modernisation, developments in specialised knowledge regimes, and increasing productivity through markets. The economy would come to constitute a privileged domain in all affairs of State. No longer would development be driven by political intensity born of sacrifice and passionate commitment. Instead, politics and the state would be turned into a  rational, protective shell surrounding an economic machine driven by individual market based incentives. 
To protect these market based initiatives, a legal code would need to be enacted.​[2]​  Thus law, like the State, was no longer regarded as a class tool, but increasingly came to be regarded as an arbiter of truth that, in the last instance, was also an instrument to protect the market.​[3]​  Increasingly, the Party slogan, ’seeking truth from facts’ meant seeking market veridiction. 
Histories would be retold,​[4]​ philosophy re-written,​[5]​ and when marketisation led to an increasing degree of affluence in large parts of the east coast, a culture industry developed. All these changes, and more, would take place as the State increasingly divested itself of the spaces it had once totally colonised. 
Large parts of what had formally been the responsibility of the state were being gradually privatised, the profit motive introduced, new specialisms and professions necessary for the smooth functioning of the market economy, introduced and developed. The development of the market economy would be the new basis upon which the Party would legitimise its rule following the failed Maoist attempts to develop a radical socialist alternative built around political intensity. The machinery of state that had once been used to channel and harness political intensity was now being gradually dismantled, re-built, re-aligned and back-engineered to enable it to adapt to the central space being allocated to market veridiction. This was necessary because market verification operated in quite a different fashion from regimes of political veridiction. 
Political veridiction operated through harnessing and channeling affective flows. It had a different rhythm, a different focus, different sets of truth claims and this all took place in a different language game.​[6]​ Where the Maoist political promised a socialist modernity based on the State’s colonisation of everything, economic reform as a mentality of government offered a gradual realignment of things that produced a regime of market verification. Where the Maoist control of the State would employ centralised planning and the machinery of political intensification to deploy its forces economically, the economic reform programme used market mechanisms and the individual profit motive to organise theirs. Unlike Maoism, Market based modernisation programmes ran through, between and sometimes away from the State rather than being generated out of it. As the dictatorial total and repressive Marxist State apparatus splintered into questions about investment, economy, profit, the law and the market, the concrete changes in China led a number of Western scholars of China to find a useful toolbox in the work of Michel Foucault on mentalities of government.  
Thus, at around the same time, on either ends of the globe, in different realms of knowledge production and for radically different reasons, a series of theoretical questions emerged about the Marxist State and the proletarian dictatorship. In re-thinking the approach to take in relation to these questions of the State, one crisis would provide the conceptual tools to understand the importance of changing mentalities, while the other would demonstrate the types of concrete material transformations that would emerge as mentalities changed. Together, these two crises, provoked a notion of Chinese governmentality.​[7]​ 
‘We have to be frank about it, there does not really exist any “Marxist theory of the State.” ’ said Louis Althusser in 1978.​[8]​ It was in that year also that Michel Foucault offered both a critique and an alternative to this theory built around an examination of the changing mentalities of government in Europe. This approach, therefore, appeared at a crucial juncture.  It appeared at the moment the State was crumbling. It was crumbling, not through violent struggles, revolutions or concrete political actions —these events would take place 11 years later, when the Berlin wall came down— but by a turn in theory. 
In Western Marxist intellectual circles in the ‘seventies, the State begins to crumble under the crippling weight of a theory that was little more than a formal and institutional elaboration of the dictatorial consequences of class struggle. Class struggle itself was little more than a class specification of the friend and enemy distinction that underpinned the Schmittian concept of the political.​[9]​ The state as a tool for the condensation and intensification of the political struggle against the enemy was, therefore, almost by definition, always functioning as a total state. Class struggle would therefore frame a binary understanding of the political that, as a concrete tool, took the form of a dictatorial State. 
The concept of a dictatorship of the proletariat would harden the Marxist approach to the State, turning it into a‘special apparatus,’ to use Lenin’s words. This special apparatus was necessarily repressive because of the nature of the enemy it faced. Rendered thus, the Marxist theory of the State posited a formation that was both totalising and repressive. Yet, as Althusser notes, it was also descriptive rather than theoretical.​[10]​ As the theoretical hegemony of Althusserian structuralism gave way in the ‘seventies to a new post-Marxist, post-structuralist critique that challenged the unities upon which this Marxist theory of the State rested, Althusser responded by at once conceding points while simultaneously endeavouring to incorporate aspects of the approach into Marxist theory as a supplement.
He would concede that there was a positivism present in Marx’s overly arithmetic and calculable conceptualisation of surplus value in Capital (Volume 1).​[11]​ The arithmetic formula that rendered the presence of surplus value visible to reason only came to the fore by reducing labour power to a commodity form thus raising the temptation “for this (arithmetical) presentation of surplus value [to] be taken for a complete theory of exploitation,” Althusser claimed.​[12]​ 
On the theory of the State, he acknowledged that Marxism drew a “negative demarcation line and definition”​[13]​ and therefore lacked the type of ‘positivity’ he would bring to the question by employing the psychoanalytic theory of interpolation. This, then, enabled class fluidities to be explained within the template of the existing Marxist theory of the State.​[14]​ More radically, perhaps, the Althusserian inspired theorist, Nicos Poulantzas, would attempt to incorporate post-structuralist elements into a new Marxist theory of the State by building on Foucault’s notion of power as fluid and, on this basis, theoretically re-define the State as a condensation of class relations.​[15]​
 All these attempts at salvaging a Marxist theory of the State were, however, to no avail because ultimately, class struggle would always intervene to produce the simple binary of friend and enemy and this, in turn, would inevitably lead to the enemy and to the State being rendered repressive and total. It was theory resting on the political imperatives arising from the  nature of the class struggle. It was precisely this repressive rendition of a total state that would bring forth one of Foucault’s earliest critiques: 
 “One of the first things that has to be understood is that power isn’t localized in the State apparatus and that nothing in society will be changed if the mechanism of power that functions outside, below, and alongside the State apparatuses, at a much more minute and everyday level, are also changed,” Foucault once said in response to the question of the Marxist concept of the State.​[16]​ 
By 1978, questions of the State had given way to broader concerns about security, population and government and it was at around this time that the minute mechanisms of power outside, below, and alongside the State apparatuses were joined by concerns about the flow of power not built around the State but running through it, flowing into and through its cracks, welling up around different issues and transforming its function while giving it life. He would go on to show how a different concept of government built around a changing mentality, extended questions beyond, through and away from the concerns of State and led toward thoughts that privileged the government of the economy and the regime of market verification that flowed from that privileging.​[17]​ 
In Europe, he argued, this could all be traced back historically to the moment of Sovereignty and the Prince.​[18]​  Just as it was under the watchful eye of Louis XIV that  disciplinary power emerged​[19]​ so, too, it would be under the watchful eye of the Prince that the word ‘economy’ would gain its modern meaning.​[20]​ The significance of this in terms of the modern regime of market verification lies in the fact that this new understanding of the word gradually, unevenly, and in disparate and often disconnected ways, brought on a new regime of truth. It is a regime of truth that gains theoretical expression and formulation in political economy and when that becomes tied to the raison d’État, it forms the basis of a new art of government which, as Foucault quickly pointed out, was the art of the least possible government, or what he called ’frugal government.’​[21]​ A frugal government would transform the flow of power. It would be dispersed in various regimes semi-autonomous regimes of care and technologies of economic profit that would find political expression in liberalism which was the political form the word economy took as a regime of market veridiction.​[22]​ Governmentality would plot the theoretical path away from the focus on those grand questions of sovereignty, the state, and other such abstractions, turning instead toward the micro-physics of power expressed in institutional forms. Frugality, then, was not confined to an economic jurisdiction but from there and through the market spread throughout society. Critically, then, this notion of frugality, tied as it was to economy, would inflate into a more general economy of power.  
Chinese governmentality was different. Frugality came to government in contemporary China not as frugal government, but as frugalness within government, named self-reliance. Self-reliance was the creed that saved the Party. Forced to flee the cities for the bandit ridden and remote wilderness of Jinggangshan after the massacre of communists in Shanghai in 1927, frugality had, by necessity, become a way of life. Frugality involved making do and that meant an investment in local indigenous, telluric ways and knowledge forms. The Maoist creed of self-reliance would emerge from this first encounter and spread across the Party and, much later, into the concerns of government. It would produce a mode of government policy and practice that involved continual experimentation and an ability to make ad-hoc adjustments. While not ‘the art of the least possible government,’ it was an art of government involving the least possible material means. It meant making do.  Frugality within government would then spread to cover all facets of life because government policy was anything but frugal in the life space it colonised.  For Maoism, frugality rendered as self-reliance was an important part of a political programme to enable communists to be one with the people in thought and deed.  This creed would remain a theoretical bedrock of the Party in both the Maoist and economic reform periods but with economic reform, it increasingly became an abstraction. There were, however, compensations. 
With self-reliance rendered abstract, the concrete form that frugality would take in the economic reform period was efficiency. With economic reform, frugality was thereby tied back to the word economy and as that transition occurred it moved from informing a political creed, into something that reinforced the privileging of the regime of market verification. 
“[T]he market must be that which reveals something like a truth”​[23]​ says Foucault and in the China of economic reform truth would be revealed in the iron clad ‘economic laws’ that underpinned a positivism within the discipline of political economy.​[24]​ Here was a version of frugalness as efficiency opening onto marketised spaces and the new knowledge regimes. Changes in economics, in law, history and philosophy accompanied policy changes in health care (Cooper), spatiality (Bray) and in morality campaigns (Cartier). Sometimes these changes would led to the formation of new disciplines (Sigley) or lead into new questions (elite philanthropy, Elaine Jefferys) or new concerns (the biopolitics of beauty and the net Woronov). Which ever way they appeared, it was clear that the singularity of political focus that had once dominated the Maoism period had been shattered into an array of different domains as the logic of the market spread into more and more domains.  As this new system of market verification began to slowly supersede the old political system, there was, from the shadows and often in de-politicised forms, an echo of Maoism. That echo was a style of thought. 
Sebastian Heilmann and Elizabeth Perry have noted this continuing attachment to a Maoist style of thought in what they have called the “guerilla-style policy making” system that still prevails in Chinese government.​[25]​ It is a mentality not a policy formulation. It involves controlling the commanding heights of the economy, a fundamental belief in public property rights, an acceptance of pervasive administrative interference and in Party supervision of senior managers. In policy terms it means ceaseless change, tension management, continual experimentation, and ad-hoc adjustments.​[26]​
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